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The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act: An Analysis of the Confusion
in its Application and a Proposal for Reform
I. INTRODUCTION
Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970' added
Chapter 96, entitled "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions" (RICO),2 to Title 18 of the United States Code. Recognizing
the increasing extent of corrupt infiltration of interstate commerce,3
Congress intended RICO to add a significant weapon to the govern-
ment's arsenal in the growing effort to combat organized criminal
influence in legitimate business operations.4 The purpose of RICO
1. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.
& 28 U.S.C.). Title IX is one of the twelve substantive titles of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970. The other titles are: Title I, Special Grand Jury, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3331-3334; Title
H, General Immunity, id. §§ 6001-6005; Title I, Recalcitrant Witnesses, 28 U.S.C. § 1826;
Title IV, False Declarations, 18 U.S.C.. § 1623; Title V, Protected Facilities for Housing
Government Witnesses, id. § 3481; Title VI, Depositions, id. § 3503; Title VII, Litigation
Concerning Sources of Evidence, id. § 3504; Title VIII, Syndicated Gambling, id. § 1511; Title
X, Dangerous Special Offender Sentencing, id. §§ 3575-3578; Title XI, Regulation of Explo-
sives, id. §§ 841.848; Title XII, National Commission on Individual Rights, id. § 3331. For
an overview of the provisions of the Organized Crime Control Act, see Note, Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, 4 U. MICH. J.L. REP. 546 (1971). See also McClellan, The Organized
Crime Control Act (S. 30) or its Critics: Which Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46 NOrE DAME
LAW. 55 (1970).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1961-1968 (1976). For an excellent discussion of the statute and early
RICO case law, see Atkinson, "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations," 18 U.S. C.
§§ 1961-68: Broadest of the Federal Criminal Statutes, 69 J. CRm. L.&C. 1 (1978).
3. In the preamble to the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Congress found that
(1) organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and
widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's economy by
unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption; (2) organized crime
derives a major portion of its power through money obtained from such illegal endeavors
as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the importa-
tion and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of social
exploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt
legitimate business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic pro-
cesses; (4) organized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the
Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, inter-
fere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten
the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens;
and (5) organized crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering
process of the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence neces-
sary to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful activities
of those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions and remedies available
to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact.
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (Statement of findings
and purpose).
4. "Organized crime" is the expression used to describe the different groups of individu-
als who supply illegal goods and services-gambling, narcotics, and other forms of vice-to
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is to enable law enforcement authorities not only to punish individ-
ual criminals but also to separate their corrupt enterprises from the
control of organized crime.5 Prior to the enactment of RICO, federal
prosecution of organized crime's use of a pattern of criminal acts to
acquire or to conduct an interstate enterprise was restricted to pros-
ecution for violations of federal statutes of generally narrow applica-
bility.' Thus, although it was possible to convict and to imprison
individual members for specific types of criminal conduct, this ap-
proach did not prevent the criminal organization from replacing the
convicted individual and continuing the illegal operation.
RICO attacks this problem by providing a means of wholesale
removal of organized crime from business enterprises engaged in
interstate commerce. Drawing on presently existing federal and
state criminal laws, RICO incorporates by reference twenty-four
federal and eight state crimes under the umbrella concept of
"racketeering activity. ' ' 7 The statute then provides that anyone
countless numbers of citizen customers. The impact of organized crime on American society
is manifest. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice
estimated that organized crime grosses from seven to fifty billion dollars a year. See U.S.
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE
REPORT: ORGANIZD CRIME 3 (1967). See generally D. PACE & J. STYLES, ORGANIZED CRIME:
CONCEPTS AND CONTROL (1975); Schelling, What Is the Business of Organized Crime?, 20 J.
PUB. L. 71 (1971); Comment, The Strike Force: Organized Law Enforcement v. Organized
Crime, 6 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 496 (1970).
5. See McClellan, supra note 1, at 141.
6. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 659 (1976) (felonious theft from interstate commerce); id. §
664 (embezzlement from pension fund); id. §§ 891-894 (extortionate credit transactions).
7. "Racketeering activity" is defined as:
(A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery,
extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under
State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which
is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code:
Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471,
472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate
shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to
embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extortion-
ate credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling informa-
tion), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section
1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal
investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforce-
ment), section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion),
section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation
of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments),
section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), sections 2314
and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property), sections 2421-24 (re-
lating to white slave traffic), (C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States
Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organiza-
tions) or section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), or (D) any offense
involving fraud connected with a case under title 11, fraud in the sale of securities, or
the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or oth-
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found to have committed two of these incorporated offenses within
a ten year period has undertaken a pattern of racketeering., If gov-
ernment prosecutors successfully connect a pattern of racketeering
with an interstate "enterprise," broadly interpreted to include
practically any personal association or business,9 the defendant may
be convicted for a violation of the RICO statute. The severe penal-
ties for a RICO violation, frequently more stringent than the penal-
ties for violations of the predicate federal or state crimes, include
fines of up to $25,000 per count, maximum prison sentences of
twenty years, and forfeiture of any interest acquired or maintained
in violation of the statute.'0 These penalty provisions have become
even harsher with judicial acknowledgement that a defendant can
be convicted and separately punished for both the underlying
crimes that form the basis of a RICO charge and for a substantive
violation of RICO without violating the double jeopardy clause."
All RICO prosecutions and decisions are significant at this time
because the statute is a potent weapon for prosecutors that is still
being tested with every new case.' 2 Designed to check the flow of
erwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the
United States.
18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1976). The definition of "racketeering activity" was amended by Pub.
L. No. 95-575, § 3(c), 92 Stat. 2465 (1978) to include violations under sections 2341-2346
relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes. This amendment was subsequently deleted
by Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. El, § 314(g), 92 Stat. 2677 (1979).
8. "Pattern of racketeering" is defined as "at least two acts of racketeering activity, one
of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within
ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of
racketeering activity." Id. § 1961(5).
9. "Enterprise" is defined as "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or
other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a
legal entity." Id. § 1961(4).
10. RICO's penalty provisions provide:
(a) Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall be fined
not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and shall
forfeit to the United States (1) any interest he has acquired or maintained in violation
of section 1962, and (2) any interest in, security of, claim against, or property or contrac-
tual right of any kind affording a source of influence over, any enterprise which he has
established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in viola-
tion of section 1962.
Id. § 1963(a) (1976).
11. The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person. . . shall. . . be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Ninth
Circuit has held that a defendant can be convicted and separately punished both for the
predicate acts that form the basis of a RICO charge and for a substantive violation of RICO,
without violating the double jeopardy clause. United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 571 (9th
Cir. 1979). In this regard the Third Circuit has suggested that conviction on the substantive
counts that form the basis of the RICO charge is necessary to uphold a RICO conviction.
United States v. Brown, 583 F.2d 659, 669 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979).
See also United States v. Pray, 452 F. Supp. 788, 801-02 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
12. Available figures indicate that there has been a sharp increase in the number of
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illegally obtained funds into legitimate business enterprises, 13
RICO's statutory language is far-reaching and the government is
probing its outermost limits.14 When those limits are overstepped,
however, and a prosecutor attempts to apply the statute to situa-
tions for which it was not primarily intended, severe hardship and
injustice may result. 5
This Note will first discuss the technical elements of a RICO
violation and set forth the four separate crimes that constitute the
statute's central provisions. After then examining RICO's crucial
statutory definitions and the confusion reflected in their applica-
tion, this Note will evaluate the various judicial interpretations of
the statute and propose a solution for amending the statute that is
harmonious with legislative intent and accommodates the needs of
both society and the individual.
II. SYNOPSIS OF CRIMINAL PROVISIONS
RICO proscribes specific criminal activity by drawing heavily
on previously enacted federal and state criminal laws.'" The statute
RICO prosecutions. Only six RICO court decisions were reported between 1970 and 1974.
Between 1975 and 1977, however, thirty-one were reported. Since 1977 more than sixty other
trial and appellate decisions have been reported. Lavine, Court Blunts Major U.S. Rackets
Law, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 17, 1979, at 1, col. 4.
13. See notes 150-70 infra and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979) (RICO conviction
for three house robberies), United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 99 S. Ct. 2055, 2056 (1979) (RICO conviction and forfeiture of family restaurant
enterprise on the basis of insubstantial contacts with illegal cocaine trafficking); United
States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1978) (RICO convicton of owner and operator
of cosmetology and beauty culture school for mail fraud violations). But see United States v.
Sutton, 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979) (RICO convictions reversed on the grounds that defen-
dants' acts of racketeering were not related to the affairs of an enterprise).
15. For a discussion of federal prosecutors' use of RICO to substantially undermine the
traditional safeguards surrounding conspiracy law, see Note, Elliott v. United States:
Conspiracy Law and the Judicial Pursuit of Organized Crime Through RICO, 65 VA. L. REV.
109 (1979).
16. See note 7 supra. In addition to RICO's criminal provisions, which are the focus of
the instant study, the statute also contains extensive civil remedies. Patterned on federal
antitrust laws, section 1964 of RICO not only provides for government civil actions in which
equitable relief may be granted but also permits private treble damage actions by any person
injured by racketeering activities. These remedies are set forth in the statute as follows:
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and
restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders, includ-
ing, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or
indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or
investments of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any person from
engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of
which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of
any enterprise, making due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
(b) The Attorney General may institute proceedings under this section. In any action
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adds the "enterprise" requirement 17 to a prosecution under the stat-
ute, but demands little additional proof beyond the evidence neces-
sary to prove the predicate crimes alleged. In outline form, the
elements of a RICO cause of action may be parsed as follows:
(1) It is unlawful for any person"
(2) through a pattern of racketeering activity" or through collection of an
unlawful debt"
(3) to, directly or indirectly, invest in, or acquire or maintain an interest in,
or conduct or participate in2'
(4) any enterpriseu
(5) that is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate commerce.?
brought by the United States under this section, the court shall proceed as soon as
practicable to the hearing and determination thereof. Pending final determination
thereof, the court may at any time enter such restraining orders or prohibitions, or take
such other actions, including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, as it
shall deem proper.
(c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section
1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and
shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
(d) A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the United States in any criminal
proceeding brought by the United States under this chapter shall estop the defendant
from denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil
proceeding brought by the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1976).
Although section 1964(c) allows any injured party to sue for treble damages even in the
absence of a criminal prosecution, no private citizen has brought a RICO suit until recently.
The first RICO treble damage count was set forth in the complaint in Hensarling v. Conti
Commodity Servs. Inc., No. 79-3112 (N.D. Ill., filed July 27, 1979). Plaintiff in Hensarling,
seeking to invoke section 1964(c)'s treble damage provision, alleged fraud in defendant-
broker's nondisclosure of material facts with regard to the sale of commodities futures. The
case is now pending before U.S. District Court Judge Hubert L. Will:
17. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
18. "Person" is defined to include "any individual or entity capable of holding a legal
or beneficial interest in property." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1976).
19. See notes 7-8 supra.
20. The statute defines an "unlawful debt" as a debt
(A) incurred or contracted in gambling activity which was in violation of the law of the
United States, a State or political subdivision thereof, or which is unenforceable under
State or Federal law in whole or in part as to principal or interest because of the laws
relating to usury, and (B) which was incurred in connection with the business of gam-
bling in violation of the law of the United States, a State or political subdivision thereof,
or the business of lending money or a thing of value at a rate usurious under State or
Federal law, where the usurious rate is at least twice the enforceable rate.
18 U.S.C. 1961(6) (1976).
21. Id. § 1962(a)-(c).
22. See note 9 supra.
23. Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce provides the constitutional author-
ity for RICO. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The commerce clause provides that Congress
shall have the power "[t]o regulate Commerce . . .among the several States. . . ... Id. See
also United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1356 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
925 (1975); United States v. Castellano, 416 F. Supp. 125, 131 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). See generally
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The crucial concept in the RICO violation is "enterprise," a term
broadly defined to include any individual, partnership, corporation,
association or other legal entity, and any labor union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.'4 It is the
relationship between the underlying federal or state predicate
crimes and the "enterprise" concept that RICO addresses.
The principal provision of the RICO statute, section 1962, de-
fines the four types of criminal activity encompassed by the Act.
A. Section 1962(a)-Legal Acquisition with Illegal Funds
Section 1962(a)21 proscribes the acquisition with any income
derived from an illegal activity of any interest in, or the establish-
ment or operation of, any enterprise that affects interstate com-
merce. The crux of the offense is the illegal derivation of the capital;
the acquisition itself may be completely legal. Subsection (a) is thus
confined to the situation in which there has been a legal acquisition
with illegal funds derived from a pattern of racketeering activity or
the collection of an unlawful debt in interstate or foreign com-
merce.
26
B. Section 1962(b)-Illegal Acquisition by Illegal Means
Section 1962(b)2 prohibits the acquisition or maintenance of
Comment, The Scope of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction Under the Commerce Clause, 1972 U.
ILL. L.F. 805.
24. See note 9 supra.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or
indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful
debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section
2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such
income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establish-
ment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes
of investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of
the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if
the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family,
and his or their accomplices in any pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of
an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of
the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact,
the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
26. See generally Note, Investing Dirty Money: Section 1962(a) of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, 83 YALE L.J. 1491 (1974).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through
collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest
in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce.
[Vol. 33:441
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any interest in or control of any enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity or loan sharking. The gist of the offense is the
illegal acquisition or maintenance of an interest or control. Thus, in
contrast to section 1962(a), which focuses on strictly legal acquisi-
tions, section 1962(b) requires proof of an illegal "takeover" of an
enterprise through bribery, extortion, a scheme to defraud, or simi-
lar criminal activity.
C. Section 1962(c)-Illegal Use of an Enterprise
Section 1962(c)" prohibits the use of an enterprise in a pattern
of racketeering activity or collection of an unlawful debt. It is aimed
at reaching any individual who, through employment or association
with others, uses an enterprise to conduct unlawful activities. Thus,
section 1962(c) encompasses a criminal syndicate's control of a busi-
ness or financial organization through the use of a corrupt individ-
ual within the organization. Subsection (c) also addresses those
instances within the coverage of the RICO statute when the enter-
prise is a group of individuals associated for the purpose of engaging
in criminal conduct.
D. Section 1962(d)-Conspiracy
Section 1962(d)2' makes conspiracy to violate subsections (a),
(b), or (c) subject to the same penalties as a violation of the substan-
tive offenses. Thus, section 1962(d) proscribes conspiracy to violate
a substantive RICO provision and not merely to commit each of the
predicate crimes necessary to demonstrate a pattern of racketeering
activity.
By identifying, isolating, and focusing on four specific types of
criminal infiltration,30 RICO provides prosecutors with the tools to
attack organized crime by penetrating to the heart of corrupt inter-
state enterprises. RICO is a powerful force, however, and caution
must be exercised in its application.3 1
28. Id. § 1962(c) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise en-
gaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
29. Id. § 1962(d) provides that "It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate
any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section."
30. See text accompanying notes 25-29 supra.
31. See notes 11-12 supra and accompanying text.
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III. ANALYSIS OF STATUTORY DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS AND THE
CONFUSION REFLECTED IN THEIR APPLICATION
An analysis of the operating definitions and underlying con-
cepts of the RICO statute is vital not only to understand the scope
of the technical statutory terminology but also to appreciate the
magnitude of the confusion that emerges from conflicting judicial
interpretations of the statute's fundamental elements.
A. Section 1961(1)-Racketeering Activity
Section 1961(1) defines "racketeering activity" as including
numerous federal offenses and, in addition, any offense involving
murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, extortion, or drugs
punishable under state law by imprisonment for more than one
year.2 Several defendants have challenged RICO on the basis that
the statute's definition of "racketeering activity" applies solely to
members of organized crime. 3 Although a majority of the courts
that have considered this issue have rejected this contention, a re-
view of the statute's legislative history reveals that the need to
combat organized crime was the reason repeatedly given for sup-
porting the unique measures of the proposed legislation.34
RICO's underlying legislative intent was first evaluated in Barr
v. WUIITAS, Inc. 5 In Barr plaintiffs, attempting to invoke RICO's
civil sanctions, moved to amend their complaint to include a count
under section 1962.6 Alleging that defendant, a national telephone
answering service, had mailed them monthly bills intentionally in-
flated by twenty percent, plaintiffs charged that the defendant cor-
poration had engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity as defined
in section 1961 to include mail fraud." In addition, plaintiffs alleged
that the money received from the inflated bills was then used to
operate the defendant corporation." Plaintiffs, however, did not al-
lege that defendant was in any way connected with organized
crime. 9 In finding plaintiffs' RICO claim for relief specious and
without merit, the court noted the frequent references in the Act's
legislative history to "racketeers," "organized crime," and
32. See note 7 supra.
33. See, e.g., United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied
sub nom. 423 U.S. 1050 (1976); United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976);
United States v. Amato, 367 F. Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
34. See note 158 infra and accompanying text.
35. 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
36. Id. at 112.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 113.
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"organized crime families," as well as the "syndicate," "Mafia,"
and "Cosa Nostra" and held that the defendant corporation could
not be properly charged under a RICO count because it was not a
member of a society of criminals operating outside the law. 0
Although a majority of the courts, rejecting the Barr defense
that RICO applies only to members of organized crime, generally
concede that Congress was primarily concerned with organized
crime in drafting the statute, they have emphasized that Congress
focused on the kinds of activities by which persons engage in racket-
eering, rather than on the status of those persons as members of
"organized crime."' This argument is straightforward and relies
almost entirely upon the text of the statute. Section 1961(3), for
instance, defines "person" to include "any individual or entity cap-
able of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property." Moreover,
each subsection of the principal provisions of section 1962 refers to
"any person"; the words are general and contain no restriction to
particular persons." In addition, neither RICO nor the Organized
Crime Control Act contains any definition of "organized crime."
Thus, the majority position emphasizes that if Congress had in-
tended to limit the application of RICO to only those persons classi-
fied as members of organized crime, it would have explicitly indi-
cated so in the statutory framework and carefully defined the term
"organized crime.' 3 Moreover, to require proof that a defendant
was a member of "organized crime," in light of the highly subjective
and prejudicial connotations of that classification, would clearly
render the statute unenforceable."
Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act also stands in
contrast to Title VI. Title VI, which addresses the preservation of
testimony in criminal proceedings through the use of depositions, is
specifically limited to situations in which the United States Attor-
ney General has certified "that the legal proceeding is against a
person who is believed to participate in organized criminal activ-
ity.' ' 45 Given the absence of a similar explicit provision in RICO, the
statute would rightfully appear to make unlawful the proscribed
criminal activity without regard to an individual's status vis-a-vis
organized crime.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied
sub nom. 423 U.S. 1050 (1976).
42. See notes 25-29 supra.
43. See United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1018-19 (D. Md. 1976). See also
Wilson, The Threat of Organized Crime: Highlighting the Challenging New Frontiers in
Criminal Law, 46 NoTRE DAME LAW. 41, 48 (1970).
44. Wilson, supra note 43, at 48.
45. 18 U.S.C. § 3503(a) (1976).
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B. Section 1961(5)-Pattern of Racketeering Activity
Section 1961(5) defines a "pattern of racketeering activity" as
requiring at least two acts of racketeering committed within a pe-
riod of ten years." Although proof of a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity is a crucial element for a RICO conviction,47 the statute does not
indicate what conduct is necessary to constitute a "pattern" in ei-
ther section 1961(5), which discusses "pattern" in quantitative
terms only," or in section 1962, which uses "pattern" as an element
of the crime charged." Moreover, the interpretation and application
of this essential RICO element has given rise to judicial confusion
and contradiction." As a result of the vague definitional contours of
the "pattern" concept, several questions emerge: should the word
"pattern" be construed to require more than accidental or unrelated
instances of proscribed behavior? Does the statutory concept of
"pattern" require that the two or more acts of "racketeering activ-
ity" actually be interrelated? How can a man of ordinary intelli-
gence decide when the execution of a single scheme ends and a
"pattern of racketeering," with the potential for triggering the harsh
RICO penalties, begins?
The word "pattern" is relatively new to the legislative criminal
lexicon.5 A literal reading of the statute which defines a "pattern"
of racketeering activity to consist of "at least two acts," 5 suggests
that the two acts must be separate. The composition of the pattern
would appear to include either two indictable acts under any two
of the incorporated twenty-four federal and eight state crimes," or,
alternatively, two separate violations involving the same incorpo-
rated offense. RICO's legislative history, however, suggests a differ-
ent interpretation. According to one of the House sponsors of the
Organized Crime Control Act, Representative Poff, the "pattern" of
racketeering activity means "at least two independent offenses
46. See note 8 supra.
47. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
48. See note 8 supra.
49. See notes 25-29 supra.
50. Compare United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub
nom. 439 U.S. 953 (1978) (the two or more predicate crimes need not be related to each other
to constitute a pattern of racketeering) with United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976) and
United States v. Scalzitti, 408 F. Supp. 1014 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (pattern of racketeering activity
requires that the two or more predicate offenses be related to each other).
51. United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd 527 F.2d 237
(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976).
52. See note 8 supra.
53. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
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forming a pattern of conduct."'" Representative Poff's definition of
pattern thus would not seem to encompass two acts that occur on
the same day in the same place and form part of a single criminal
episode. This definition accords with the statutory definition of
"pattern" in the Senate Report:
The condept of "pattern" is essential to the operation of the statute. . . .The
target of Title IX is thus not sporadic activity. The infiltration of legitimate
business normally requires more than one "racketeering activity" and the
threat of continuing activity to be effective. It is this factor of continuity plus
relationship which combines to produce a pattern."
Thus, the question of exactly what conduct constitutes the requisite
pattern of racketeering remains unclear: the statutory definition
requires only two "acts," but the legislative history suggests a nar-
rower and somewhat more precise explanation of the pattern re-
quirement.
The confusion and uncertainty inherent in reconciling the sta-
tutory definition with the legislative history of the "pattern" re-
quirement is clearly reflected in the development of RICO case law.
For example, the recent Fifth Circuit decision in United States v.
Elliott" represents a completely different analysis and application
of the requisite pattern of racketeering principles from that ex-
pressed by the leading three prior decisions. 5 In Elliott the court
noted that the provisions of RICO do not proscribe either associa-
ting with an enterprise or engaging in a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity standing alone." The gravamen of the offense described in
section 1962(c), the Fifth Circuit reasoned, is the conduct of an
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.5
Consequently, the court concluded that the two or more predicate
crimes must be related to the affairs of the enterprise but need not
otherwise be related to each other."0
Conversely, in United States v. Stofsky 1 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York held that the word
"pattern" included as a requirement that the racketeering acts
must be connected with each other by some common scheme, plan,
54. 116 CONG. REc. 35193 (1970).
55. SENATE COMM. ON THE JuDIciARY, REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL AcT OF 1969,
S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
56. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978).
57. United States v. Scalzitti, 408 F. Supp. 1014 (W.D. Pa. 1975); United States v.
White, 386 F. Supp. 883-84 (E.D. Wis. 1974); United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 614
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
58. 571 F.2d at 899 n.23.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
1980]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
or motive so as to constitute a pattern."2 In reaching this decision,
the Stofsky court stated that the word "pattern" should be con-
strued as requiring more than accidental or unrelated instances of
proscribed behavior. 3 The court supported this interpretation by
analogy to the meaning of "pattern" under the civil rights acts."
Noting further that statutes enacted together with the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970 have been construed in pari materia,65
the court buttressed its position by pointing to 18 U.S.C. § 3575,
a simultaneously enacted section of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970, in which a "pattern of criminal conduct" is requisite
for special offender status for the purpose of sentencing. In this
regard, the court observed that section 3575(e) provides that
"criminal conduct forms a pattern if it embraces criminal acts
that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, vic-
tims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by
distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events." 7 The
Stofsky court further emphasized that despite the quantitative na-
ture of the section 1961 definition of "pattern," the major concern
of Congress, when it enacted sections 1961 et seq. was the special
danger to legitimate business of a continuity of racketeering activ-
ity."8 Thus, the Stofsky court concluded that "a pattern of racket-
eering activity," as used in RICO, requires that the two or more acts
of racketeering activity be interrelated.6 The different judicial in-
terpretations of the pattern requirement illustrated by Elliott and
Stofsky and the problems posed by the search for the proper inter-
pretation of this element emerge as a common theme in RICO cases.
This confusion as to the meaning of "pattern" clearly needs to
be resolved. By placing the label of racketeer and the resulting
severe penalties ° on an individual who has demonstrated a propen-
sity for racketeering activities, Congress must have intended that
the individual have engaged in criminal activity more serious than
unrelated and disconnected acts. This concern becomes even more
important with the realization that it is possible that a series of
intrastate acts will be deemed racketeering if some negligible effect
on interstate commerce can be demonstrated. The Stofsky ap-
62. Id. at 614.
63. Id. at 613.
64. Id; see, e.g., United States v. Gilman, 341 F. Supp. 891, 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
65. 409 F. Supp. at 614.
66. Id.
67. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1976)).
68. 409 F. Supp. at 614.
69. Id.
70. See notes 10-11 supra and accompanying text.
71. See notes 7 & 23 supra.
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proach appears to offer the better reasoned view. Since RICO is
aimed at the special danger to legitimate businesses posed by a
continuity of racketeering activity and not at individual criminal
acts, which are already adequately proscribed under other federal
and state laws, the statute should require that the predicate racket-
eering acts must be connected with each other by some common
scheme, plan, or motive so as to constitute a pattern. Any other
interpretation of the pattern requirement has the effect of reading
this element out of the statute and replacing it with the need to
prove merely the commission of any two unrelated criminal acts.
Congress enacted RICO specifically to attack the infiltration of in-
terstate business enterprises; a narrow definition and interpretation
of the pattern element of the crime will prevent RICO from becom-
ing simply a criminal catch-all.
C. Section 1961(6)-Unlawful Debt
The use or investment of funds collected on an unlawful debt
is prohibited under section 1962.12 Only one "collection of an unlaw-
ful debt," in contrast to proof of at least two acts of racketeering
activity, is necessary to establish a RICO violation. 3 Analysis of the
statute's definition of unlawful debt, however, reveals its vagueness
and overbreadth. Section 1961(6) defines "unlawful debt" as:
a debt (A) incurred or contracted in gambling activity which was in violation
of the law of the United States, a State or political subdivision thereof, or
which is unenforceable under State or Federal law in whole or in part as to
principal or interest because of the laws relating to usury, and (B) which was
incurred in connection with the business of gambling in violation of the law of
the United States, a State or political subdivision thereof, or the business of
lending money or a thing of value at a rate usurious under State or Federal
law, where the usurious rate is at least twice the enforceable rate. 4
The use of "a State" in this definition raises a number of vexing
and unsettled problems by creating a federal law against gambling
and usury. For example, a gambling transaction may involve activ-
ity in more than one state. If such activity is legal in one state and
illegal in the other, the section 1961 definition suggests that inno-
cent action in one state may be the grounds for proving the collec-
tion of an "unlawful debt" in the other. The RICO statute thus fails
to identify which state's laws should govern an interstate gambling
transaction.
The definitional terminology of section 1961(6), moreover, ap-
pears to establish a usury standard indexed to the most exacting
72. See notes 25-29 supra.
73. See notes 7-8 & 20 supra.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(6) (1976).
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state law. If the maximum lawful interest rate in State A is fifteen
percent and in State B is twelve percent, the collection of a debt in
State B by a citizen of State A from another citizen of State A could
constitute the collection of an "unlawful debt."75
The statute also fails to define the term "collection." The
collection of unlawful debts, however, as embodied in the substan-
tive criminal offenses enumerated in section 1962, would appear to
apply to only two types of criminal activity; illegal gambling and
loan sharking. Unfortunately, the statute fails to define exactly
what conduct constitutes either a "business of gambling" or
"business of lending money." Thus, although RICO specifically
incorporates violations of the federal gambling statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1955,76 it fails to specify whether the statutory terminology
"business of gambling" has a different meaning from the definition
of "illegal gambling business" as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1955.
This distinction is important because one of the elements necessary
to prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955 is the involvement of five
or more persons.77 Addressing this statutory ambiguity, the Sev-
enth Circuit, one of the only courts to consider this issue, held in
United States v. Nerone5 that the jurisdictional requirements of a
section 1962 RICO violation differ from those of a section 1955 gam-
bling violation. As a result, the Nerone court found that the defini-
tion of "illegal gambling business" as used in section 1955 is in-
applicable to section 1962.71 The court, however, ultimately failed
to resolve the question of what conduct is sufficient to meet the
RICO definition of "business of gambling."
The failure to define the terms "business of gambling,"
"business of lending money," and "collection of an unlawful debt"
75. For a discussion of the problems with the usury standards in RICO, see the dissent-
ing views of Representatives Conyers, Mikva and Ryan in HousE COMM. ON THE JUDCIARY,
REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL Acr OF 1970, H. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
186 (1970) [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT].
76. See note 7 supra.
77. 18 U.S.C. § 1955(b) (1976) provides:
As used in this section-
(1) "illegal gambling business" means a gambling business which-
(i) is a violation of the law of a State or political subdivision in which it is conducted;
(ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct, or
own all or a part of such business; and
(iii) has been or remains in substantially continuous operation for a period in excess
of thirty days or has a gross revenue of $2,000 in any single day.
78. 563 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1977). See also United States v. Salinas, 564 F.2d 688 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1977) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 1961(6), which defines
unlawful debt, applies in a state that forbids gambling although there is no specific statutory
proscription of business of gambling).
79. 563 F.2d at 853.
[Vol. 33:441
RICO ANALYSIS
raises serious doubts about whether these aspects of RICO can with-
stand scrutiny under the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment.10 Due process entitles every citizen to a precise statutory
warning that makes it possible for him to decide intelligently, in
advance, exactly what course of conduct is lawful for him to pur-
sue.81' Moreover, the due process guarantees provide that "[n]o
one may be required at peril of life, liberty, or property to speculate
as to the meaning of penal statutes."8
Section 1961(6)'s crude attempt to define "unlawful debt" and
section 1962's dependence on the undefined concept of "collection
of an unlawful debt" in those cases in which the "pattern of racket-
eering activity" element is not present raises the problem of consti-
tutional invalidity for statutory vagueness. The lack of specific sta-
tutory definitions for these touchstone concepts leaves a number of
questions unanswered and open to myriad interpretations in differ-
ent jurisdictions: Which state's law governs an interstate gambling
transaction? Can a poker party in the privacy of one's own home
that involves an exchange of money trigger a RICO prosecution?
What conduct does the statute proscribe in the "collection" of an
unlawful debt? Is the potential of force or violence requisite for
proving a "collection" under section 1962 as it is under the extor-
tionate extension of credit provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 892?3
To date, the potentially broad reach of RICO allowed by this
lack of specific legal definitions has been tempered only by prosecu-
torial discretion. The delegation to prosecutors of such fundamental
matters, however, for resolution on an ad hoc basis, with the attend-
ant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application, is constitu-
tionally unacceptable. To allow a prosecutor or court to define and
to apply on a case-by-case basis such vague but nevertheless crucial
concepts clearly offends the due process considerations underlying
the constitutional principle that any federal or state criminal stat-
80. The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person shall ...be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
81. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 393 (1926).
82. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) ("No one may be required at the
peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are
entitled to be informed as to what the state commands or forbids.")
83. The Extortionate Extension of Credit Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-896 (1976) defines an
extortionate extension of credit as
any extension of credit with respect to which it is the understanding of the creditor and
the debtor at the time it is made that delay in making repayment or failure to make
repayment could result in the use of violence or other criminal means to cause harm to
the person, reputation, or property of any person.
18 U.S.C. § 891(6) (1976).
84. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
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ute must give fair warning of the conduct that it proscribes."5 Thus,
section 1961(6)'s definition of "unlawful debt" and section 1962's
concept of "collection of an unlawful debt" fall short of the require-
ments of certainty imposed by the fifth amendment due process
clause.
D. Section 1961(4)-Enterprise
"Enterprise" is the most crucial concept in the RICO statute;
it is the relationship between the underlying federal or state predi-
cate crimes and the enterprise notion that the statute addresses.'
Section 1961(4) defines enterprise to include "any individual, part-
nership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any
union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity. 8 7 Analysis and application of the enterprise concept, how-
ever, has given rise to confusion and inconsistency. The debate over
the precise scope of the enterprise notion generally focuses on three
principal areas: first, whether the statute applies to persons engaged
in racketeering activity unrelated to any legitimate enterprise; sec-
ond, whether a RICO enterprise properly encompasses a foreign
corporation or group of corporations; third, whether an enterprise
may properly include either an office of government or an agency
of government.
(1) Application to Racketeering Activity Unrelated to a Legiti-
mate Enterprise
There is presently a wide split among the United States Circuit
Courts on what kinds of enterprises fall within the scope of RICO.
The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Suttonu recently held that an
85. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972); United States v.
Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939); Connally
v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
86. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
87. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976).
88. 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979) (2-1 decision). Judge Albert J. Engel in dissent argued
that the plain language of the RICO statute is not limited in application to the illegal
infiltration of legitimate businesses. Id. at 273-74. Although recognizing that such a broad
interpretation of the statute makes it possible for federal enforcement to intrude heavily into
areas of traditional state domain, the dissent nevertheless asserted that RICO applies to both
illegal and legitimate enterprises. Id.
On November 7, 1979, the Sixth Circuit granted the government's petition for en banc
consideration of the Sutton decision. The oral argument in the en banc consideration of the
case is presently scheduled for April 1980.
Although the majority opinion in Sutton has been a source of controversy, there is
evidence that this position is gaining wider judicial recognition. The Seventh Circuit, in a
split decision addressing a factual situation strikingly similar to that of Sutton, recently held
that RICO could be applied against defendants who were not actively involved in infiltrating
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enterprise includes only formally constituted groups "organized and
acting for some ostensibly lawful purpose, either formally declared
or informally recognized."'" This decision flies in the face of deci-
sions in the Second, 0 Fifth, 91 Seventh, 2 Ninth 3 and District of Col-
umbiag4 Circuits, all of which have upheld broader interpretations
of the enterprise concept. Consequently, a close analysis of the
Sutton decision, the arguments advanced by the majority opinions
in the Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth and District of Columbia Cir-
cuits, the vigorous dissents in the Second and Ninth Circuit deci-
sions, and RICO's legislative history is necessary to untangle the
controversy surrounding the enterprise concept.
The conflict between the circuits as to the proper scope of the
enterprise concept focuses on those instances in which the alleged
enterprise is delineated as a group of individuals associated in fact
to engage in some unlawful activity. 5 In such circumstances, defen-
dants have argued that Congress only intended to cover
"legitimate" businesses within the definition of enterprise and that
the "group of individuals associated in fact" was in their case an
illegitimate entity. Since to date this contention has been successful
only in Sutton, the Sixth Circuit's analysis and reasoning in that
case deserve careful study.
In Sutton the government argued for an expansive reading of
the enterprise element that included not only legitimate but also
plainly illegitimate enterprises. Noting that the statute on its face
does not distinguish between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" enter-
prises, but instead applies to "any enterprise," the government
emphasized that the term "enterprise" is defined broadly in section
ongoing, established business enterprises. United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir.
1979). Judge Luther M. Swygert, however, dissenting in Aleman, argued that the application
of RICO to the "pattern" of criminal activity at issue in the case-the robbing of homes-was
"absurd." Id. at 311. Citing Sutton, Judge Swygert stated: "I believe that the recent Sixth
Circuit opinion in United States v. Sutton . . .correctly decides this very issue. The facts
are analogous, and the Government's contentions are the same. Judge Merritt has offered,
with admirable clarity, an analysis that is irrefutable." Id. at 312.
89. 605 F.2d at 270.
90. United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039
(1977).
91. United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. 439 U.S. 953
(1978); United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hawes, 529
F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976).
92. United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Cappetto,
502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
93. United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979).
94. United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct.
2055 (1978).
95. See note 9 supra.
96. 605 F.2d at 264.
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1961(4) to include "any individual, partnership, corporation, asso-
ciation, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity."97 Thus, the govern-
ment argued, since the evidence demonstrated that the appellants
were a "group of individuals associated in fact" and that each com-
mitted the required number of racketeering offenses while in that
association, their convictions were plainly within the scope of
RICO."' The government had clearly proven the existence of a single
enterprise operated for the purpose of making money from repeated
criminal activity.9
The Sutton court, however, rejected the government's literal
treatment of the definition of enterprise as seriously flawed.,"0 Start-
ing with the dictionary meaning of "enterprise" as any
"undertaking" or "project," the court noted that the term is also
often used to describe a unit of organization established to perform
any such undertaking or project.'0 ' Although the RICO statute de-
fines enterprise only in the latter sense, section 1961(4) cataloges the
types of organizational units that may qualify as an enterprise as
ranging from legal entities, such as corporations or partnerships, to
entities without formally recognized legal personalities, such as
labor unions or a group of individuals associated in fact, and finally
even to "any individual." The court then noted that the statute is
silent as to what attributes or activities these units must assume or
undertake before they constitute an "enterprise."'0 2 Reasoning that
every "individual" or "group of individuals," considered in the ab-
stract, is not an enterprise, the court observed that individuals and
groups do not become an enterprise except in relation to something
they do.' 3 Thus, the Sutton court concluded that the statutory defi-
nition of enterprise contained in section 1961(4) is incomplete be-
cause it does not define what that "something" is."'
The government had finessed this problem, the court main-
tained, by characterizing appellants as a "group of individuals asso-
ciated in fact" around numerous patterns of racketeering activity,
and therefore as an "enterprise" organized for the purpose of profit-
ing from racketeering activity.' 5 Hence, in the government's view,
97. Id.
98. Id. at 264-65.









the racketeering activity was the "something" that transformed the
group of individuals into an enterprise;"6 the appellants' enterprise
was racketeering.
In reviewing previous case law in which the government had
succeeded in merging the enterprise requirement into the racketeer-
ing activity, the Sutton court noted that in United States v.
Cappetto the defendants had been charged with engaging in a pat-
tern of racketeering activity "consisting of participating on two or
more occasions in an illegal gambling business" in the conduct of
the affairs of an enterprise, "viz., an illegal gambling business." '
Moreover, in United States v. Morris, the enterprise was described
as "a group of individuals associated in fact to defraud in illegal
card games persons who had travelled to Nevada," and the racket-
eering activity through which the enterprise's affairs were con-
ducted consisted of running fraudulent card games and recruiting
victims to travel to Nevada.' 8 The Sutton court reasoned, however,
that to apply the statute in such a fashion reads the enterprise
element out of the statute and virtually transforms it into a simple
proscription against "patterns of racketeering activity."'' 09 Thus, the
court concluded that the approach reflected in cases such as
Cappetto and Morris transformed every "pattern of racketeering
activity" into an "enterprise" if its affairs were conducted through
the "pattern of racketeering activity."" 0
The Sutton court, turning to the precise statutory language,
noted that the language of the statute makes it unlawful "'for any
person employed by or associated with any enterprise . . . to con-
duct. . . such enterprise' s affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity.' ""' The court observed that Congress would not have
chosen such a complex formulation if the legislative purpose had
been merely to proscribe simply racketeering activity; if this pur-
pose alone had been Congress' intent, not only would a straight-
forward prohibition against engaging in "patterns of racketeering
activity" have sufficed but it would have been unnecessary to
introduce the "enterprise" concept."' The court stated that the
plain meaning of the words in context indicates that the reference
to enterprise was included to denote an entity larger than, and










through which the enterprise's affairs might be conducted."' Thus,
the court observed that if the enterprise element is to have indepen-
dent meaning, a "criminal enterprise" must involve something
more than simply an individual or group engaged in a pattern of
racketeering activity."'
Ultimately distilling the crux of the issue as the statutory dis-
tinction between simple patterns of racketeering activity outside
RICO's scope and criminal enterprises within RICO's ambit, the
Sixth Circuit concluded that the RICO statute failed to address the
question of how to determine when racketeering becomes a criminal
enterprise."' In reaching this determination, the court specifically
rejected the definition advanced by the Fifth Circuit in United
States v. Elliott that a criminal enterprise is "an amoeba-like infra-
structure that controls a secret criminal network." 6 The Sutton
court reasoned that due process required greater statutory precision
and held that persons of ordinary intelligence are entitled to know
before the fact at what point their criminal activities will be deemed
sufficiently "amoeba-like" to violate the statute."7
The Sixth Circuit's detailed analysis of RICO's enterprise ele-
ment in Sutton radically departs from the earlier case law address-
ing this issue. In United States v. Altese18 the Second Circuit con-
sidered whether section 1962(c) applied only to a legitimate enter-
prise that was conducted through a pattern of racketeering activity
or the collection of unlawful debts. The Altese court examined the
language of section 1962 that "[it shall be unlawful for any person
. . . who has received any income derived from any pattern of rack-
eteering activity, etc., to use any part of such income in the acquisi-
tion of any enterprise engaged in . . . interstate or foreign com-
merce."" 9 In light of the continued repetition of the word "any," the
Second Circuit inferred no legislative intent to eliminate illegiti-
mate businesses from RICO's scope.2 0 Thus, the court concluded
that, on the basis of what it termed clear, precise, and unambiguous
language-the use of the word "any"-all enterprises conducted
through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful
debts fall within the interdiction of RICO.
2 '




116. 571 F.2d at 897-98.
117. 605 F.2d at 266.
118. 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976).
119. Id. at 106 (emphasis in original).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Judge Van Graafeiland wrote in dissent. Id. at 107-11.
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misconstrued the language and legislative history of RICO and pre-
dicted that the majority's holding would radically extend federal
jurisdiction to virtually every criminal venture affecting interstate
commerce.'23 The dissent contended that the majority's extensive
reliance on the word "any" that precedes "enterprise" in section
1962 was misplaced. 12 Noting that the majority opinion omitted any
reference to section 1961(4), which sets forth the definition of enter-
prise, the dissent determined that the scope of section 1962, on its
face, is uncertain at best.'2 Turning to the legislative history, the
dissent argued that Congress never contemplated that "enterprise"
as used in sections 1961 and 1962 would extend beyond legitimate
businesses or organizations. Moreover, the dissent was deeply trou-
bled by the majority's lack of awareness of the prospective conse-
quences of their decision on the sensitive federal-state relationship,
limited federal police resources, and the resultant transformation of
relatively minor state offenses into federal felonies by mere geo-
graphic happenstance. 2 The dissent concluded that the result of
the majority's expansive interpretation of section 1962(c) was to
equate the word "enterprise" with the term "conspiracy."'
2 7
The Fifth Circuit also adopted an expansive interpretation of
enterprise by holding that the term encompasses more than legiti-
mate businesses. In United States v. Hawes 28 the Fifth Circuit re-
jected the argument that RICO reached only legitimate business
enterprises.' 2' It is important to note, however, that the enterprise
at issue engaged in the legitimate manufacture, sale, repair, and
leasing of jukeboxes and penny arcade amusements in addition to
its illegal gambling operations. 30 As a legitimate business front for
racketeering activities it clearly fell within the ambit of those activi-
ties that Congress intended RICO to combat. In United States v.
Morris,'3 however, the Fifth Circuit extended this liberal interpre-
tation of the RICO enterprise concept when it held that the concept
encompassed a group of individuals associated in fact to defraud in
illegal card games persons who had travelled to Nevada and that the
racketeering activity through which the enterprise's affairs were
conducted consisted of running fraudulent card games and recruit-
123. Id. at 107.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 108.
127. Id.
128. 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976).
129. Id. at 479.
130. Id. at 476.
131. 532 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1976).
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ing victims to travel to Nevada.'32 An analysis of Hawes and Morris
therefore indicates that the Fifth Circuit interpretation of RICO
reads the enterprise element out of the statute and regards section
1962 as prohibiting racketeering activity per se so long as the requi-
site effect on commerce can be found.
A subsequent Fifth Circuit decision, United States v. Elliott,'
responding to judicial criticism of the court's consideration of the
enterprise element in Hawes and Morris,'34 stated that RICO ex-
tended beyond conventional business organizations to reach "any
• . . group of individuals" whose association, however loose or infor-
mal, furnished a vehicle for the commisson of two or more predicate
crimes.3 5 The court found no distinction for "enterprise" purposes
between a "duly formed corporation that elects officers and holds
annual meetings and an amoeba-like infra-structure that controls a
secret criminal network."'36 The court, however, did not address how
the enterprise element retained any actual independent significance
in view of its assertion that any informal group qualifies as an enter-
prise. Thus, the Elliott decision, although reflecting the Fifth Cir-
cuit's recent concern with the need to identify the enterprise ele-
ment, did not really depart from the court's expansive interpreta-
tion of the enterprise concept in Hawes and developed in Morris.
The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Cappetto'37 held that
section 1962 applied to all gambling enterprises, legitimate or illegi-
timate.'35 Although the appellants in Cappetto argued that the legis-
lative intent underlying section 1962 was to protect "legitimate
business" against infiltration and not to prohibit racketeering itself,
the Seventh Circuit, relying on its interpretation of the language
and legislative history, rejected this contention.'' Acknowledging
that one of Congress' principal targets, as reflected in section
1962(a), was the "infiltration of legitimate organizations," the court
pointed to the language of subsections (b) and (c) of section 1962 to
demonstrate that Congress also intended to prohibit "any pattern
of racketeering activity in or affecting commerce."'' To buttress
132. Id. at 442.
133. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978).
134. Dissenting in Altese, Judge Van Graafeiland, in discussing the Fifth Circuit's
consideration of the scope of section 1962 in Hawes and Morris, stated: "'Concededly, ...
the Fifth Circuit now regards § 1962 as prohibiting racketeering activity per se as long as the
requisite effect on commerce can be found. I am confident that Congress never intended such
a result." 542 F.2d at 111.
135. 571 F.2d at 898.
136. Id.
137. 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974).





this contention, the Seventh Circuit first looked to the Second Cir-
cuit's holding in United States v. Parness. "I The Cappetto court
then analyzed a statement from the Senate Report on Title IX of
the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.142 The Seventh Circuit's
reliance on these two sources, however, appears flawed. The Parness
decision addressed only the question of whether RICO's enterprise
concept encompassed foreign as well as domestic corporations' and
never considered whether the enterprise concept included the opera-
tion of illegitimate as well as legitimate enterprises. Moreover, the
Seventh Circuit's use of the Senate Report on Title IX to demon-
strate that Congress intended to include illegal gambling business
within the category of enterprises covered by section 1962 is mis-
placed. The excerpt from the Senate Report on which the Seventh
Circuit relied applies only to Title VIII, which deals with proscribed
gambling businesses.'" Therefore, given the inappropriateness of
the Seventh Circuit's reasoning the Cappetto opinion would not
appear to have great precedential value.
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Rone"4 also considered
whether an enterprise must be a legitimate business to bring it
under the umbrella of RICO. Adopting an analysis strikingly similar
to the one employed by the Second Circuit in United States v.
Altese, "I the Rone court held that any enterprise conducted through
a pattern of racketeering activity falls within the purview of
RICO. "7 The dissent,"' however, argued that the majority placed
unnecessary reliance on the word "any" preceding "enterprise" in
141. 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975). For a discussion of
Parness, see text accompanying notes 171-74 infra.
142. The Cappetto court examined the following statement from the Senate Committee
Report on the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970:
Despite the best efforts made to date by both the Federal and the several State govern-
ments, gambling continues to exist on a large scale to the benefit of organized crime and
the detriment of the American people. A more effective effort must be mounted to
eliminate illegal gambling. In that effort the Federal government must be able not only
to deny the use and facilities of interstate commerce to day-to-day operations of illegal
gamblers-as it can do under existing statutes-but also to prohibit directly substantial
business enterprises of gambling ....
SENATE REPORT, supra note 55, at 72-73.
143. 503 F.2d at 439-40.
144. The portion of the Senate Report that the Cappetto court relied on related to
section 1955 (the gambling statute). The quoted language was clearly never intended to be
applied to sections 1961 or 1962. United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d at 110; United States v.
Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 60 (D. Conn. 1975). See also Note, Organized Crime and the
Infiltration of Legitimate Business: Civil Remedies for "Criminal Activity", 124 U. PA. L.
REV. 192, 202-03 (1975).
145. 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979).
146. See text accompanying notes 118-21 supra.
147. 598 F.2d at 568.
148. Judge Ely wrote in dissent. Id. at 573-74.
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section 1962. Adopting the perceptive analysis of the vigorous
Altese" dissent, the Rone dissent concluded that Congress never
contemplated that enterprise, as used in sections 1961 and 1962,
would extend beyond legitimate businesses or organizations 5
The foregoing analysis of the scope of the enterprise concept in
RICO reveals the judicial inconsistency, uncertainty, and contradic-
tion underlying the concept's interpretation and application. Be-
cause a surface reading of the statute fails to define the proper scope
of this vital element, a consideration of the statute's legislative his-
tory is necessary.
The RICO statute enacted in 1970 is the product of two bills
independently introduced in the Senate in 1969.111 On January 15,
1969, Senators McClellan, Ervin, and Hruska introduced S. 30.152
This bill originally had only eight titles and did not include the
RICO provisions. On March 20, 1969, Senator Hruska introduced S.
1623, the "Criminal Activities Profits Act."'53 Patterned upon tradi-
tional antitrust legislation, S. 1623 prohibited the investment of
"certain illegally gained income in any business enterprise affecting
interstate or foreign commerce." On April 18, 1969, Senators
McClellan and Hruska jointly introduced S. 1861, the "Corrupt
Organizations Act of 1969."'15 Aimed at proscribing the infiltration
or management of legitimate organizations by racketeers, S. 1861
merged the framework of Senator Hruska's original Criminal Activi-
ties Profits Act with several provisions first presented by Senator
McClellan in S. 30 into a new, complete act that was subsequently
incorporated as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970.15
From the date of its introduction as the offspring of S. 30 and
S. 1623, Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 focused
on the infiltration of legitimate businesses by organized crime. The
Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee, for instance, unequivoc-
ably stated that Title IX "has as its purpose the elimination of the
149. See text accompanying notes 122-27 supra.
150. 598 F.2d at 574.
151. Hearings on Measures Relating to Organized Crime Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 556-
57 (1969). See also McClellan, supra note 1, at 61-62.
152. S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 527 (1969).
153. S. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 6925 (1969).
154. S. 1861, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 9512 (1969). A companion bill was
introduced in the House by Congressman Poff on April 21, 1969, H.R. 10312, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 9753 (1969).
155. Hearings on S. 30 and Relative Proposals Relating to the Control of Organized
Crime Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
106 (1970) See also 116 CONG. REc. 602 (1970).
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infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate or-
ganizations operating in interstate commerce."'' Similarly, the
Department of Justice described Title IX before the House Judici-
ary Committee as "designed to inhibit the infiltration of legitimate
business by organized crime, and, . . to reach the criminal syndi-
cates' major sources of revenue." ' 7 Moreover, an examination of the
legislative debates that accompanied the passage of Title IX dem-
onstrates that Congress was only concerned with the infiltration of
legitimate business.'18 Thus, the House and Senate Reports, the
Justice Department's recommendation, the opinion of the House
dissenters, and the floor debates all reflect legislative intent to limit
Title IX's scope to organized crime's corruption of legitimate enter-
prises. Indeed, Senator McClellan succinctly stated this legislative
consensus during the floor debates when he described RICO as a
potent weapon aimed at those criminals who "operate illegitimately
in legitimate channels."
'' 5'
In view of the concern Congress exhibited solely as to organized
crime's corruption of legal enterprises, it is necessary to analyze
RICO's statutory framework and terminology with respect to the
enterprise concept. Although the legislative intent, which restricts
the enterprise concept to legitimate business entities, apparently
156. SENATE REPORT, supra note 55, at 76.
157. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 75, at 56-57.
158. The legislative debates that accompanied the passage of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970 fully establish the limited scope of Congress' intentions. Congressional
concern with the infiltration of legitimate businesses is the central theme reflected throughout
the legislative history. In this regard, Senator McClellan stated that "with its extensive
infiltration of legitimate business, organized crime thus poses a new threat to the American
economic system. The proper functioning of a free economy requires that economic decisions
be made by persons free to exercise their own judgment." 115 CONG. REC. 5874 (1969).
Senator McClellan in the Senate debates said that Title IX "is aimed at removing
organized crime from our legitimate organizations . . . . Title IX attacks the problem by
providing a means of wholesale removal of organized crime from our organizations . . . in
view of the extent of infiltration of our legitimate organizations by the mob." 116 CONG. REC.
591-92 (1970).
Senator Dole stated that Title IX "would create strict criminal penalties for using the
proceeds of racketeering activity to acquire an interest in businesses engaged in interstate
commerce, or to acquire or operate such businesses by racketeering methods." 116 CONG. REC.
36296 (1970).
House sponsor Representative Poff, in discussing Title IX, pointed out that "perhaps the
single most alarming aspect of the organized crime problem in the United States in recent
years has been the growing infestation of racketeers into legitimate business enterprises. This
evil corruption of our commerce and trade must be stopped." 116 CONG. REc. 35295 (1970).
Moreover, Senator McClellan, as principal sponsor of the Act, stated his understanding
of Title IX as follows: "Unless an individual not only commits such a crime but engages in a
pattern of such violations, and uses that pattern to obtain or operate an interest in an
interstate business, he is not made subject to proceedings under Title IX." McClellan, supra
note 1, at 144.
159. 116 CONG. REC. 8671 (1970).
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leads to the rather undesirable result that a racketeer is better off
the more illegal his activities, a careful study of the structure of
RICO reveals that this is not the case. Illegitimate criminal activi-
ties are already comprehensively proscribed and punished by the
previously existing twenty-four federal and eight state criminal laws
that RICO incorporates by reference under the umbrella concept of
racketeering activity.10 Given the already well-defined nature of
established criminal penalties for these independently separate fed-
eral and state crimes, RICO's special purpose becomes clear-to
impose even harsher penalties on already adequately proscribed
criminal behavior when it is aimed at the infiltration of legitimate
businesses.
RICO's inherent limitation to legitimate entities is also re-
flected in the statute's framework and language. Section 1961(4)
sets forth a uniform definition of an enterprise as that term is used
throughout the statute."6 ' Section 1962(a) proscribes acquisition by
means of any income derived from an illegal activity of an interest
in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise that affects
interstate commerce. 62 This subsection further provides that a
"purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of invest-
ment" with illegally derived capital is not unlawful so long as the
holdings of the purchaser, the members of his immediate family,
and his accomplices in any pattern of racketeering activity or the
collection of an unlawful debt "do not amount in the aggregate to
one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do
not confer . . . the power to elect one or more directors of the is-
suer.' ' 63 Thus, the language of subsection (a) requires that the en-
terprise be a legitimate one. It is difficult to justify the application
of a broader definition of enterprise to the other principal subsec-
tions of section 1962-subsection (b) prohibits the use of racketeer-
ing to "acquire or maintain . . . any interest in or control of any
enterprise," and subsection (c) proscribes the "conduct of [an]
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity" 6 4-since subsections (a), (b), and (c) all derive from the same
definition of enterprise in section 1961(4).165
This review of the legislative history and the statutory frame-
work and terminology reveals that the enterprise element of RICO
should be narrowly construed to encompass only legitimate entities.
160. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
161. See note 9 supra.
162. See notes 25-26 supra and accompanying text.
163. See note 25 supra.
164. See notes 27-28 supra.
165. See note 9 supra.
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The recent decision in United States v. Sutton, in which the Sixth
Circuit held that RICO could be invoked only against formally con-
stituted groups "organized and acting for some ostensibly lawful
purpose," is the first to recognize that any other interpretaton of
this important statutory concept reads the enterprise element com-
pletely out of the crime.' Through a careful analysis of legislative
history, statutory language, and canons of statutory construction,
the Sutton court correctly recognized that any of the prior interpre-
tations of the enterprise element could make a federal felon out of
any individual or any member of a group who has committed any
two of the broad range of federal and state offenses denominated
racketeering activity by section 1961(1).111 Although such a sweeping
expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction may be within Congress'
power, such an interpretation cannot be inferred from the vague
contours of the statute. Hence, the Sutton majority' and the vigor-
ous dissents in Altese'l and Rone'70 properly recognized that
"enterprise" as used in sections 1961 and 1962 should not extend
beyond legitimate businesses or organizations. RICO, like a high-
powered rifle, is carefully aimed at organized crime's infiltration of
legitimate entities and its scope should not be enlarged into a blun-
derbuss approach by judicial construction.
(2) Application to a Foreign Corporation or Group of Corporations
The debate over the scope of the enterprise concept extends
beyond those instances in which the alleged enterprise is delineated
as a group of individuals associated in fact to engage in some unlaw-
ful activity. The debate also includes controversy over the geograph-
ical reach of the enterprise concept and the possible amalgamation
of different corporate and quasi-corporate business entities into a
single enterprise.
In United States v. Parness'7' the Second Circuit considered
whether Congress had in fact or by express intention extended the
geographical reach of the RICO enterprise concept to include the
acquisition of a foreign corporation by means of criminal conduct
committed in the United States.7 Recognizing not only that section
1962(b) proscribes the acquisition of "any interest in or control of
any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
166. See text accompanying notes 88-117 supra.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See text accompanying notes 122-27 supra.
170. See text accompanying notes 148-50 supra.
171. 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974).
172. Id. at 439.
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interstate or foreign commerce," but also that section 1961(4) de-
fines enterprise to include "any. . .corporation," the Parness court
found no inference that Congress intended RICO to have a parochial
application.7 3 Consequently, the Second Circuit dismissed appel-
lant's claim that RICO is limited to the infiltration of purely domes-
tic enterprises, noting that such an interpretation would both frus-
trate the statute's salutary purposes and permit domestic criminal
activity to escape prosecution under RICO when the ill-gotten gains
were simply invested in a foreign enterprise.' 7
4
In United States v. Huber'75 the Second Circuit again con-
fronted the problem of defining the meaning and application of the
RICO enterprise concept. Appellant, convicted for participating
through racketeering in the affairs of an enterprise consisting of
seven wholly-owned corporations, argued that the seven corpora-
tions did not qualify as an enterprise within the meaning of RICO.' 76
To this end, appellant emphasized the definition of enterprise set
forth in section 1961(4) .17 Noting that the term "corporation" in
section 1961(4) is only in the singular, the appellant reasoned that
a group of corporations may be an enterprise only if they qualify as
a "group of individuals associated in fact.' ' 78 Appellant then
pointed out that section 1961(3) does not define "individual" except
as a species of "person. 179 Thus, appellant contended, since section
1961(3) defines "person" to include "any individual or entity capa-
ble of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property," the disjunc-
tive reference to "individuals" on the one hand and "entities capa-
ble of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property" on the other
hand demonstrates that the term "individual" was meant only to
refer to natural persons.' Moreover, appellant argued that to inter-
pret the "group of individuals" classification as encompassing
"corporations, associations, and other legal entities" would render
the definition of enterprise in section 1961(4) completely super-
fluous and repetitious. 8 1 Therefore, appellant maintained that a
group of corporations cannot be a "group of individuals associated
in fact" within the meaning of the enterprise concept.
In rejecting appellant's argument that a group of corporations
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979).
176. Id. at 393.
177. Id.
178. Id.





cannot be an enterprise, the Second Circuit relied on the statutory
language of section 1961(4).182 Noting that the definition of enter-
prise is a list that begins with the word "includes," the court held
that such a list is merely illustrative and by no means exhaustive.
The court recognized that in enacting RICO Congress was con-
cerned with the impact on the American economy of the infiltration
of organized crime into interstate commerce and concluded that
appellant's interpretation of the statute would perversely insulate
the most sophisticated racketeering combinations from RICO's
reach.' Hence, the Second Circuit determined that multi-corporate
groupings qualify as an enterprise under RICO.
The Second Circuit in Parness and Huber properly rejected the
appellants' myopic interpretations of the enterprise concept. Recog-
nizing that Congress intended to purge the influences of organized
crime from the American business community as a whole, and not
merely its infiltration into purely domestic enterprises, the Parness
court examined the substantive impact that Parness' activities had
on domestic commerce rather than focusing exclusively on the for-
eign nature of the corrupt corporation involved in the pattern of
racketeering.'84 Similarly, the Huber court, realizing that appel-
lant's argument that a group of corporations cannot be an enter-
prise ' would insulate cunningly structured corporate combinations
from RICO's sanctions, rejected such an overly rigid reading of the
enterprise definition. The Second Circuit's analysis and application
of the enterprise element in Parness and Huber properly addresses
the evil at which the statute was thoughtfully aimed-the infiltra-
tion of legitimate businesses by organized crime.
(3) Application to Governmental Entities
Defendants indicted under RICO for racketeering activity in-
volving corruption of state governmental entities have challenged
the applicability of the statute on the grounds that a governmental
body is not an enterprise within the meaning of section 1961(4).
Although such challenges have met with varying degrees of success,
the debate over whether a RICO enterprise properly encompasses
only private entities continues.
United States v. Frumento88 was one of the first cases to con-
sider the question of whether an enterprise properly includes such
182. Id. at 393-94.
183. Id. at 394.
184. See note 174 supra and accompanying text.
185. See text accompanying notes 182-83 supra.
186. 405 F. Supp. 23 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
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public entities as governmental departments or agencies. In
Frumento defendants, former employees of the Pennsylvania De-
partment of Revenue's Bureau of Cigarette and Beverage Taxes
(Bureau), charged that the Bureau, as a government agency, was
not an enterprise under RICO.'87 The court rejected defendants'
challenge as an unreasonably narrow interpretation of the statute
and, relying on both the specific language of the statute and the
relevant legislative history, held that the Bureau clearly qualified
as an enterprise. 8 8 The Frumento court first noted that Congress
provided that Title IX "shall be liberally construed to effectuate its
remedial purposes."'8 9 Scrutinizing the legislative history to deter-
mine the scope of these remedial purposes, the court observed that
a synopsis of the Senate bill subsequently enacted as the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970 stated that Title IX "prohibit[ed,] by
racketeers or proceeds of racketeering[,] activities where interstate
commerce is affected."' Probing further into the legislative history,
the court argued that the repeated use of the term "organization,"
not only in the statutory language but also in the remarks of Senator
McClellan, the principal sponsor of the bill and floor leader in the
Senate, belied the narrow interpretation advanced by defendants
that the Act was only intended to combat the corruption of legiti-
mate businesses and labor unions.'9 ' Thus, the Frumento court con-
cluded that the congressionally-mandated broad construction of
RICO's enterprise concept properly included illegal activity involv-
ing a governmental agency.'92
While the defendants in Frumento appealed this decision to the
Third Circuit,'93 the Federal District Court in Maryland was pre-
sented with a strikingly similar issue in United States v. Mandel. "I
In Mandel the Governor of the State of Maryland and several other
defendants were indicted on twenty counts of mail fraud and four
RICO counts of prohibited patterns of racketeering activity. Defen-
dants argued that the court should dismiss one count of the RICO
indictment on the ground that the State of Maryland was not an
enterprise." 5 The government, however, contended that a state falls
within the statutory definition of enterprise on the basis that it
187. Id. at 29.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 29-30.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 30.
193. United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom.
434 U.S. 1072 (1978).
194. 415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976).
195. Id. at 1020.
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qualifies either as a "legal entity" or a political "corporation."'",
Addressing the question of whether the State of Maryland qual-
ified as an enterprise under RICO, the Mandel court expressed cau-
tion about construing expansive and undefined statutory language
to the broad limits that the words taken by themselves might ini-
tially suggest."' Thus, the court decided that a review of the legisla-
tive history of the statute was necessary to ascertain the legislative
intent regarding the scope of the enterprise concept.
The court noted that the legislative history of Title IX of the
Organized Crime Control Act contained no express consideration of
the question whether an enterprise may include such public entities
as governments and states.' ' 8 Recognizing that it would be difficult
to infer from this legislative silence any authority to construe the
statute so broadly as to include public entities, the court contended
that such an interpretation would disregard the plain purposes of
Title IX. The court acknowledged that the principal purpose of
Title IX was to eradicate racketeering influences from the commer-
cial life of the nation and emphasized that nothing in the legislative
history indicated any concern over the subversion of states or gov-
ernments."' Furthermore, the court observed that the judiciary
should be reluctant to give a broad construction to a criminal stat-
ute that would transform matters of primarily local concern into
federal felonies.2 0
The Mandel court then examined the District Court's holding
in United States v. Frumento0' that the Pennsylvania Department
of Revenue's Bureau of Cigarette and Beverage Taxes was an enter-
prise. Although recognizing that Congress had instructed that RICO
should be "liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes,"
the Mandel court declared that this Congressional mandate cannot
require the courts to abandon the traditional canon of interpretation
that ambiguities in criminal statutes are to be construed in favor of
leniency. 2 ' Specifically rejecting the Frumento analysis, the
Mandel court held that a state does not qualify as an enterprise
within the meaning of the RICO statute.20 3
Following Mandel, the Fifth Circuit in United States v.





200. Id. at 1021.
201. 405 F. Supp. at 29-30; see text accompanying notes 186-92 supra.
202. 415 F. Supp. at 1022.
203. Id.
204. 555 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978).
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was an enterprise. Rejecting the contention that RICO encompassed
only private corporations and labor organizations as overly narrow
and unsupported by legislative history, the court noted that the
actual language of section 1961(4) defines enterprise to include any
"legal entity" or "group of individuals associated in fact although
not a legal entity."205 Consequently, the Fifth Circuit concluded that
a police department qualified at least as a group of individuals
associated in fact if not also as a legal entity.206 The Brown court
looked to the expansive phrases regarding the corruption of the
"democratic processes" and threats to "domestic security" set forth
in the Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose of the Or-
ganized Crime Control Act °0 to justify this broad interpretation of
the enterprise concept.2 8 The Fifth Circuit buttressed such an ex-
pansive reading of the enterprise notion by pointing to the statutory
language providing that the provisions of Title IX "shall be liberally
construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.""2 9 The Fifth Circuit
thus found no justification in either the statutory definition or
RICO's legislative history for limiting the language of section
1961(4) to exclude individuals and entities in the public sector.
The most recent decision to address the sharply conflicting
views represented by Frumento, Mandel, and Brown is the Seventh
Circuit's opinion in United States v. Grzywacz. 21° Defendants, for-
mer police officers of Madison, Illinois, were charged with conspir-
acy to violate the RICO statute by conducting and participating in
an enterprise, the Madison, Illinois, Police Department, through a
pattern of racketeering activity. On appeal to the Seventh Circuit,
defendants maintained that they could not be charged with conspir-
acy under RICO because a police department is not an enterprise.
21'
Arguing that a public utility such as a municipal police department
cannot constitute an "enterprise engaged in . . .interstate or for-
eign commerce . . . ," defendants stated that no legislative intent
supported the application of RICO to acts of corruption by public
employees or officials.
2 12
After considering precedent, legislative history, and the express
language of RICO, the Seventh Circuit held that public entities and
205. Id. at 415.
206. Id.
207. For the text of the Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose to the Organ-
ized Crime Control Act of 1970, see note 3 supra.
208. 555 F.2d at 415.
209. Id. at 416.
210. 603 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1979).




individuals may properly constitute section 1961(4) enterprises
through which racketeering is conducted .2 1 Looking to the Third
Circuit's decision in United States v. Frumento2l' and the Fifth
Circuit's holding in United States v. Brown, 21, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that section 1961(4) draws no distinctions between the
public and private sector. Consequently, the Grzywacz court held
that a police department and individual police officers are legal
entities and thus qualify as an enterprise under RICO.
2
1
A strong dissent 217 in Grzywacz argued that the majority placed
too much reliance on broad language extracted from the Congres-
sional Statement of Findings and Purpose of the Organized Crime
Control Act (of which Title IX is but one of eleven titles) and vir-
tually ignored the narrow language in the legislative history and the
statute.218 Pointing to the majority's use of such expansive phrases
from the Act's statement of findings and purpose as "subvert and
corrupt our democratic processes" and "general welfare of the na-
tion" to support its broad reading of the enterprise notion, the dis-
sent vigorously attacked the rationale of the majority opinion. 219
Noting that in 2097 pages of hearings, two congressional reports,
and the statutory language of RICO there are no explicit references
to governmental units as "enterprises," the dissent argued that the
only rational explanation is that Congress did not intend the term
"enterprise" to encompass governmental organizations. 20 Finally,
the dissent, in a careful review of the legislative history of Title IX,
set forth a persuasive argument that Congress did not intend to
include governmental units within the ambit of the enterprise provi-
sions of RICO.22" '
The dissent also contended that the majority ignored not only
the doctrine of ejusdem generis,222 which warns against expansive
213. Id. at 685-86.
214. The Third Circuit opinion in Frumento affirmed the district court's pretrial order
which is discussed in the text accompanying notes 186-92 supra.
215. See text accompanying notes 204-09.
216. 603 F.2d at 687.
217. Judge Swygert wrote in dissent. Id. at 690-94.
218. Id. at 690.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 691.
222. The ejusdem generis doctrine may be defined as follows:
[Wihere general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a
particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their
widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general
kind or class as those specifically mentioned.
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 608 (4th ed. 1951); see United States v. Mescall, 215 U.S. 26, 31
(1909); United States v. Insco, 496 F.2d 204, 206 (5th Cir. 1974).
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interpretations of broad language that immediately follows narrow
and specific terms, but also the due process principle that statutes
creating crimes must be strictly construed. 21 Thus buttressing the
lack of support for an expansive reading of the enterprise concept
in RICO's legislative history with an analysis of the majority's disre-
gard of two canons of statutory interpretation, the dissent concluded
that a police department does not qualify as a RICO enterprise.21
4
The conflicting interpretations of the definition of the enter-
prise concept vis-a-vis state governmental entities and the judicial
gloss that shadows this crucial aspect of RICO highlight the neces-
sity for consistency and clarity. Since 2097 pages of hearings, two
congressional reports, and the operative provisions of Title IX make
no explicit references to governmental bodies as enterprises,22 5 the
most rational explanation is that Congress did not intend to include
government organizations as RICO enterprises. Although the Fifth
and Seventh Circuits have looked to the expansive phrases such as
the corruption of the "democratic processes" and threats to
"domestic security" that appear in the Congressional Statement of
Findings and Purpose to find legislative justification for a broad
interpretation of the enterprise concept of Title IX,26 on close analy-
sis this rationale appears flawed. The broad phrases drawn from the
Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose apply generally
to all eleven titles of the Organized Crime Control Act. 227 Canons of
statutory construction and common sense indicate that such a
broad introductory statement should not be used as authority for
the interpretation of one specific definition within one subsection of
one of the eleven titles when much more specific legislative history
is readily available.
RICO's legislative history, completely silent on the classifica-
tion of public entities as enterprises, is replete with examples of
legislators' use of the word "business" synonymously with the statu-
tory concept of "enterprise.2 128 Again and again the legislators con-
sidered the enterprise concept with reference to the major purpose
of RICO-the eradication of racketeering influences from the com-
mercial life of the nation.229 Probing the extent of organized crime's
infiltration into the business community, Congress examined the
impact of such infiltration in a wide variety of contexts, including
223. 603 F.2d at 692.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 690.
226. See text accompanying notes 207 & 219 supra.
227. See notes 1 & 3 supra.




industry, unions and service organizations. At no time, however,
was any consideration given to inclusion in the enterprise concept
of public entities such as the federal government, a state govern-
ment, or any of their instrumentalities.
An analysis of the delicate balance of federal-state relationships
reveals that even if Congress had considered the applicability of
RICO to corruption at the state governmental level it would have
had to do so with the utmost caution since RICO's validity rests
upon Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce.2 Al-
though it is well settled that Congress has the power to prohibit
activities made lawful by state law that take place in, or affect,
interstate commerce, the Supreme Court has held that the com-
merce power does not extend to the regulation of the conduct of
integral government functions at the state level. In National League
of Cities v. Usery"I the Supreme Court held that the minimum wage
and overtime pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act 212 are
inapplicable to state government employees. Congress' intention
that the Fair Labor Standards Act should apply to state governmen-
tal bodies was evidenced not only by the inclusion in the definitional
provisions of the Act that an enterprise comprised related activities
performed for a common business purpose, but also by the defini-
tion of business purpose to include the activities of a "public
agency.''2 3 The Supreme Court, however, held that Congress could
not properly designate an agency of state government as an enter-
prise subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act.
States already have their own efficient means for combatting
threats to their integrity posed by organized crime. States have laws
governing the conduct of public officials that adequately protect a
state from any racketeering acts undertaken by that official. To
permit Congress to use the commerce clause power to create laws
binding on state officials would grant Congress the power to destroy
the essentials of state sovereignty. Congress, in enacting the RICO
statute, never intended to expand the power of the commerce clause
230. See note 23 supra.
231. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). For a discussion of the applicability of RICO to state govern-
mental entities in light of the Usery decision, see Brief for Defendant Sisk Re: "Enterprise"
and Legislative History, at 25-27, United States v. Sisk, 476 F. Supp. 1061 (M.D. Tenn. 1979).
232. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 & 557 (1976).
233. Section 203(r) of the Fair Labor Standards Act specifies that "'enterprise' means
the related activities performed (either through unified operation or common control) by any
person or persons for a common business purpose . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 203(r) (1976). Section
203(r)(3) further provides that a common business purpose explicitly includes the activities
"of a public agency." Id. § 203(r)(3). In addition section 203(s)(5) expressly defines




by intruding into criminal matters traditionally handled entirely by
the states."4 Moreover, since Congress did not intend the RICO
enterprise concept to apply to state governmental entities, it ex-
cluded the word "state" in the definition of enterprise in section
1961(4).235 Consequently, a RICO enterprise does not properly en-
compass state governmental entities and overzealous prosecutors
should not be permitted to include in RICO's definition of enterprise
that which Congress wisely omitted. The Mandel court and the
vigorous dissent in Grzywacz reached this proper conclusion when
each refused to apply the RICO enterprise concept to state govern-
mental entities. It is inconceivable that Congress, without expressly
providing, intended to federalize crimes that involve the acts of
public officials and thus profoundly alter the traditionally delicate
federal-state balance.
IV. COMMENT AND PROPOSAL
RICO is a powerful force designed by Congress to aid the gov-
ernment's efforts against professional and organized criminals by
checking the flow of illegally obtained funds into legitimate business
enterprises. 3 ' The complex nature of RICO's essential provisions,
the broad statutory language of the Act, and prosecutorial zeal in
invoking RICO23 7 have unfortunately combined to result in the ap-
plication of the statute to situations for which it is not primarily
intended.2 3 The statute has begun to be applied so widely against
234. The Federal Government must never assume the role of the Nation's police-
man. True the Federal Government has certain direct law enforcement responsibilities.
But these are carefully limited to such matters as treason, espionage, counterfeiting, tax
evasion and certain interstate crimes.
Crime is essentially a local matter. Police operations-if they are to be effective and
responsible-must likewise remain basically local. This is the fundamental premise of
our constitutional structure of our heritage of liberty.
L. JOHNsON, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME TO OuR SociTv, H.R. Doc. No. 250, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. 4 (1968).
235. For the statutory definition of enterprise, see note 9 supra.
236. See note 151-59 supra and accompanying text.
237. In United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979), Judge Feinberg warned
against prosecutorial zeal in invoking RICO:
We note ... that the potentially broad reach of RICO poses a danger of abuse where a
prosecutor attempts to apply the statute to situations for which it was not primarily
intended. Therefore, we caution against undue prosecutorial zeal in invoking RICO. We
also emphasize to the district judges that when RICO is invoked each set of facts must
be evaluated independently.
Id. at 395-96.
238. See, e.g., United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979) (RICO conviction
for three house robberies); United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1978) (RICO




such myriad criminal activities that the major purpose underlying
the statute's enactment has paradoxically become obscured. Thus,
although the statute was designed to attack organized crime's use
of racketeering profits to infiltrate and to gain control of private
enterprises, a review of RICO case law reveals that the use of the
statute for such purposes is rare. Instead, government prosecutors
have seized upon RICO's expansive language and judicial willing-
ness to construe the statute in an unreasonably broad manner to
distort deliberately the reach of the statute and to extend its outer-
most limits. Consequently, in view of the extent of. prosecutorial
abuse of RICO and judicial willingness to allow its misconstruction,
principles of fundamental fairness demand that immediate atten-
tion be given to these problems. The scope of the statute must be
narrowed, either by the judiciary or Congress, so that it focuses on
the evil it was designed to address-the infiltration of legitimate
businesses by organized crime.
First, the definition of pattern of racketeering activity in sec-
tion 1961(5) must be clarified to follow the guidelines of Stofsky in
requiring that the racketeering acts be connected with each other
by some common scheme, plan or motive.29 This solution would
effectively prevent the prosecution of an individual under RICO for
the commission of completely unrelated criminal acts already ade-
quately proscribed by other presently existing federal and state
criminal laws. A concise explanation of the interrelationship be-
tween the acts of racketeering activity necessary to establish a pat-
tern could be adopted from the Proposed Federal Criminal Code's
definition of "pattern" which provides that "[acts of racketeering
activity] . . . have the same or similar purposes, results, partici-
pants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interre-
lated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated
events."4 0 The amendment of section 1961(5)'s definition of pattern
of racketeering activity to include this language would codify the
Stofsky guidelines and go a long way toward resolving the confusion
and inconsistency evidenced by judicial interpretations of this cru-
cial RICO concept.
Second, a close examination of the statutory framework sug-
gests that the "collection of an unlawful debt" provision as an alter-
nate method of establishing a RICO violation might profitably be
239. See notes 61-71 supra and accompanying text.
240. Proposed Criminal Code Reform Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 1437, S. 31, S. 45, S.
181, S. 204, S. 260, S. 888, S. 979, S. 1221 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and
Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9633 (1977).
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eliminated.4 ' In addition to removing the troubling due process
questions, the elimination of this provision would help to narrow
the scope of the statute to reflect more precisely the legislative
intent underlying its enactment. Since RICO is specifically aimed
at the special danger posed by a continuity of racketeering activ-
ity,243 before the harsh penalty provisions of the statute are invoked,
evidence of such a continuity, rather than of one isolated criminal
act, should be required. The pattern of racketeering provision af-
fords some guarantees since it requires the commission of at least
two predicate criminal acts. The same, however, cannot be said for
the "collection of an unlawful debt" provision that requires only a
single criminal act to establish a RICO violation.
In addition, the prohibited activities encompassed by the
"collection of an unlawful debt" provision, primarily illegal gam-
bling and loan sharking, are already adequately covered under
RICO's umbrella concept of racketeering activity.24 Thus, while the
"collection" alternative contributes little to effectuate the remedial
purposes of the statute, this provision is pregnant with the potential
for abuse by permitting the harsh sanctions of RICO to apply to an
individual guilty of only an isolated criminal act.24 5 Hence, the
"collection" provision, as it presently stands, poses a great potential
for abuse against individual defendants without significantly con-
tributing to the statute's effectiveness. Furthermore this provision
flaunts both concepts of fair treatment and the eighth amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment 246 and thus
should not be allowed to stand.
Third, the wide split among the United States Circuit Courts
on which kinds of enterprises fall within the scope of RICO
4 must
be resolved. This divergence between the circuits focuses on those
instances in which the alleged enterprise is delineated as a group of
individuals associated in fact to engage in some unlawful activity.
241. See notes 72-73 supra and accompanying text.
242. See notes 80-85 supra and accompanying text.
243. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
244. The definition of racketeering activity in section 1961(1) specifically incorporates
18 U.S.C. §§ 891-894 (1976) (extortionate credit transactions) and 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1976)
(prohibition of illegal gambling businesses). See note 7 supra.
245. For a discussion of RICO's harsh penalty provisions, see notes 10-11 supra and
accompanying text.
246. The eighth amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII. Although the Supreme Court has not heard a RICO case to date, it did note that RICO
and other sections of the Organized Crime Control Act contain "relatively severe penalty
provisions." lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 786-87 & 787 n.19 (1975).
247. See text accompanying notes 88-95 supra.
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Recognizing that every "individual" or "group of individuals," con-
sidered in the abstract, is not an enterprise, the Sixth Circuit in
United States v. Sutton48 was the first to realize that individuals
and groups do not become enterprises except in relation to some-
thing they do. Hence, the Sixth Circuit properly recognized that the
definition of enterprise in section 1961(4) is incomplete because it
fails to define what that something is.
Decisions by the Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth and District of
Columbia Circuits,'4 however, have evaded this crucial issue. These
courts have tautologically reasoned that a "group of individuals
associated in fact" around numerous patterns of racketeering activ-
ity constitutes a statutory "enterprise" organized for the purpose of
profiting from racketeering activity. The Sixth Circuit in Sutton
properly recognized that such an interpretation reads the enterprise
element out of RICO and transforms the statute into a simple pros-
cription against racketeering activity.
Given the extent of judicial confusion and contradiction sur-
rounding the proper interpretation of the RICO enterprise concept,
it is clear that this statutory definition needs redrafting. The
amendment that would probably best codify the legislative intent
underlying RICO-the concern with the growing financial infiltra-
tion and corrupt operation of legitimate business operations-would
be the addition of the term "legitimate" to the definition of enter-
prise in section 1961(4). Such an amendment, however, has two
drawbacks: first, "legitimate" is a slippery term and a good defini-
tion will be difficult to arrive at; second, any attempt to define
"legitimate" might result in organized crime's structuring sophisti-
cated racketeering combinations specifically to evade the statute.
Alternatively, in order to extend the reach of the statute to
illicit enterprises of some description, and yet preserve the content
of the enterprise element, a set of standards might be grafted upon
the definition of enterprise sufficient to warn any person or group
engaged in racketeering activity when they will be deemed to have
embarked upon an "enterprise" to that end. The problem here, of
course, is to develop flexible enough guidelines to cover the variety
of crimes committed by organized criminals while at the same time
to preserve the integrity of the statute.
Perhaps the best solution to this dilemma is to amend the defi-
nition of enterprise in section 1961(4) to reflect the Sixth Circuit's
Sutton decision. In Sutton the court held that an enterprise within
the meaning of the statute is "any individual, partnership, corpora-
248. See text accompanying notes 88-117 supra.
249. See text accompanying notes 118-50 supra.
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tion, association . . . and any union or group of individuals asso-
ciated in fact that is organized and acting for some ostensibly lawful
purpose, either formally declared or informally recognized. '" ' 50
Rather than restricting RICO's reach to solely "legitimate" enter-
prises, the Sutton definition strikes an equitable balance between
legitimate and illegitimate enterprises. Thus, whenever any person
associated with an enterprise meeting the Sutton test conducts its
"affairs," for example, undertakes any activity on behalf of, or relat-
ing to, the purpose of the enterprise, by committing at least two
criminal acts constituting a pattern of racketeering, a RICO viola-
tion could be found.
Codification of the Sutton enterprise definition would not only
narrow the scope of RICO to reflect the type of criminal activity that
Congress sought to proscribe, but also would leave prosecutors with
a flexible enough standard to combat the ingenuity characteris-
tically demonstrated by organized crime.
V. CONCLUSION
Since its enactment by Congress on October 15, 1970, the Rack-
eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act has been the sub-
ject of increasing controversy throughout the district and circuit
courts concerning the scope of its operative language and the inter-
pretation of many of its fundamental elements. With the Depart-
ment of Justice seeking more indictments under RICO, the risk of
draconian applications of the statute from prosecutorial overreach-
ing becomes apparent.
The scope of the statute must be narrowed, either by the judici-
ary or Congress, and its language refined to focus on the evil it was
designed to eradicate-the financial infiltration and corrupt opera-
tion of legitimate business operations. With such a corrected focus,
RICO would be a powerful tool equal to the difficult task of combat-
ting the sophisticated elements of organized crime. Without such
remedial revisions, RICO will continue to develop into a standard-
less criminal catch-all.
WHITNEY LAWRENCE SCHMIDT
250. 605 F.2d at 270.
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